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Appendix A: Sub-National Turnout Estimates 
 
 
In the main text of the paper, we evaluate turnout effects using cross-national data. 
While useful, this approach does not allow us to evaluate whether turnout differs between 
opposition and incumbent supporters. Here we pursue an alternative strategy that allows us to 
differentiate between these voters. Our approach takes advantage of turnout estimates from 
Afrobarometer and Latin American Public Opinion Projects surveys conducted from 2006 to 
2012 (Afrobarometer, AmericasBarometer).
1
 These are regular surveys conducted in a 
number of different African and Latin American states in order to measure attitudes towards 
democracy and governance. The samples are designed to be representative of the voting age 
population in each country. Using these data, we are able to code reported voter turnout for 
37,727 respondents across 30 countries and 41 elections.
2
 
Using these data, we estimate the following model: 
 𝑷(𝑽𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒊𝒋) = 𝒇( 𝜷𝑬𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑽𝒊𝒐𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒋𝒌 ∗ 𝑶𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒋𝒌 + 𝜷𝑬𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑽𝒊𝒐𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒋𝒌 +
 𝜷𝑶𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒋𝒌  + 𝝋𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒌) 
Here Vote equals one if respondent k claims to have voted in election j in country i 
and zero if respondent k claims not to have voted.  Opposition equals one if the respondent 
claims to support a party other than the incumbent’s3 and zero if the respondent claims to 
support the incumbent. Building upon similar models by Kuenzi and Lambright,
4
 we include 
controls for demographic and social factors likely to predict turnout in Africa, such as 
                                                 
1
 We are not able to include estimates from Asia Barometer due to the lack of questions about voting behavior.  
2
 We code the following surveys Mexico 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012; Guatemala 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012; El 
Salvador 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012; Honduras 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012; Nicaragua 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012; Costa 
Rica 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012; Colombia 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012; Ecuador 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012; Paraguay 
2006, 2008, 2010, 2012;  Chile 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012; Uruguay 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012; Brazil 2006, 2008, 
2010, 2012; Venezuela 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012; Argentina 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012; Dominican Republic 2006, 
2008, 2010, 2012; Haiti 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012; Jamaica 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012; Guyana 2006, 2008, 2010, 
2012; Benin 2004, 2007; Botswana 2004; Ghana 2004; Kenya 2002, 2007; Madagascar 2002, 2007; Malawi 
2004; Mali 2002, 2007; Mozambique 2004; Namibia 2004; Nigeria 2003, 2007; Senegal 2000, 2007; South 
Africa 2004; Tanzania 2000, 2005; Uganda 2001,2006; Zambia 2001, 2006; Zimbabwe 2005, 2008. 
3
 We exclude cases where there is no incumbent party contesting the election.  
4
 Kuenzi and Lambright 2010 
 3 
 
education, age, gender, employment and income.
5
 Some of these control controls are not 
shared across the two surveys, and so our control variables are not the same between all of 
our models. However our results remain consistent. We also include additional country-level 
controls which might affect turnout, such as Victory Uncertain, Polity2, Multi-Round Voting, 
and Compulsory Voting.
6
 We describe the coding details and summary statistics for all 
controls in Appendix B.  
The results are consisted with our hypothesis. Column 1 of Table A1 reports the 
independent effect of Pre-Election Violence and Opposition and shows no significant overall 
effect of Pre-Election Violence. This is consistent with the relatively weak effects of pre-
election violence found using the cross-national turnout data. Columns 2-4 include an 
interaction demonstrating that the effect of violence differs between opposition and 
incumbent supporters. Overall we estimate that incumbent supporters are approximately 2.8% 
more likely to vote than opposition supporters in violent elections. There is no significant 
difference in turnout between opposition and incumbent supporters in non-violent elections.  
These effect sizes are similar even when we limit the sample to Afrobarometer or Americas 
Barometer surveys. These effects are substantive, and potentially pivotal in close elections. 
For comparison, employment increases a respondent’s likelihood of voting by 7.9%. We plot 
these effects in Figures A1-A3. 
 
There are several challenges in interpreting these results. First, it is possible that 
respondents, when faced with the threat of violence, will lie about their true party preferences 
                                                 
5
 Afrobarometer does not directly measure income. Instead we include two proxies for income: (1) the number 
of times a respondent’s family has gone without food in the past year and (2) whether the respondent has access 
to electricity.  
6
 We exclude the full list of controls due to the small number of countries and the limitations this places on our 
statistical power. The results are robust to the inclusion of any single cross-national control variable. The main 
results are also robust to the use of robust clustered standard errors; though clustered errors are known to be 
biased with small number of clusters (here countries). This is likely to be the case here, especially in our 
restricted samples.  
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and turnout decisions. This kind of response bias would likely prejudice us against a 
significant finding since threatened voters are likely to under-report turnout or exaggerate 
their support for incumbent parties (Jung et al. 2014). A second challenge is that not all 
respondents in a violent election are necessarily exposed to violence. To the extent this is a 
problem it is likely to lead to weaker results; however we think it reasonable to believe that 
most respondents in violent elections are going to be aware of the possible threat of violence, 
even if they are not exposed directly. As noted by several studies, election violence is 
frequently well reported in local and national media outlets prior to the election.
7
  
We interpret these results – along with the estimates printed in the main draft – as 
preliminary evidence that violence successfully coerces incumbent supporters into turning out 
on election day or, equivalently, violence may be coercing opposition supporters into staying 
home—we cannot conclusively differentiate in this paper. Either way, these effects are 
electorally advantageous to incumbents, and potentially decisive in close elections. We are 
the first (to our knowledge) to demonstrate that incumbent and opposition groups respond 
differently to violence.
8
  
  
                                                 
7
 For instance, an analysis of the 2001 Ugandan election by McIntosh and Allen (2009) found over 250 separate 
public reports of electoral violence in the national media during the electoral cycle. Hafner-Burton, Hyde and 
Jablonski (2014) similarly document high levels of reporting of violent electoral events during recent elections 
in Zimbabwe and Iran. 
8
 Bratton 2008; Robinson and Torvik 2009 also discuss turnout effects; however unlike our study, neither of 
these empirically evaluate whether turnout differs between incumbent and opposition supporters.  
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Table A1: The Effect of Pre-Election Violence on Reported Turnout 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Vote Vote Vote Vote 
 
    
Pre-Election Violence -0.022 0.102* -0.018 0.425** 
 (0.032) (0.044) (0.084) (0.059) 
Opposition -0.047+ 0.041 0.087 -0.058 
 (0.028) (0.035) (0.060) (0.048) 
Pre-Election Violence * Opposition  -0.219** -0.238* -0.165* 
  (0.055) (0.099) (0.072) 
Gender   -0.099** -0.100** 0.106* -0.012 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.045) (0.036) 
Education  -0.049** -0.050** -0.019** -0.011 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) 
Employed   0.528** 0.523** 0.518** 0.414** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.052) (0.039) 
Polity2 0.005 0.008+ -0.020 0.029** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.020) (0.006) 
Victory Uncertain  -0.037 -0.034 -0.135+ 0.047 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.073) (0.038) 
Multi-Round Voting 0.210** 0.193** 0.017 0.410** 
 (0.053) (0.054) (0.073) (0.088) 
Compulsory Voting 0.022 0.028 0.109* n.a. 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.052)  
Access to Food    0.040** 
    (0.015) 
Head of Household    0.352** 
    (0.041) 
Access to Electricity    -0.164** 
    (0.038) 
Age    0.062** 
    (0.002) 
Latin America Barometer 0.522** 0.503**   
 (0.047) (0.047)   
Constant 1.324** 1.273** 1.688** -1.245** 
 
(0.041) (0.042) (0.158) (0.090) 
Observations 37,727 37,727 14,495 22,612 
Log Likelihood -18,709 -18,701 -6,724 -10,506 
Afrobarometer Data Yes Yes No Yes 
LAPOP Data Yes Yes Yes No 
Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Figure A1: The Effect of Pre-Election Violence on Turnout, Afrobarometer  
 
Note: This figure shows the effect of Pre-Election Violence on the probability of 
voting. Estimated from a logit model with controls individual demographic 
characteristics (gender, age, education, employment, head of household status and 
income), Polity2, Victory Uncertain, Compulsory Voting and Multi-Round Voting. 
Our data come from Afrobarometer surveys (round 3 and 4).   
 
 
 
 7 
 
Figure A2: The Effect of Pre-Election Violence on Turnout, Latin America 
Barometer  
 
Note: This figure shows the effect of Pre-Election Violence on the probability of 
voting. Estimated from a logit model with controls individual demographic 
characteristics (gender, education and employment), Polity2, Victory Uncertain, 
Compulsory Voting and Multi-Round Voting. Our data come from the Latin America 
Public Opinion Project surveys.   
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Figure A3: The Effect of Pre-Election Violence on Turnout, All Surveys  
 
Note: This figure shows the effect of Pre-Election Violence on the probability of voting. 
Estimated from a logit model with controls individual demographic characteristics (gender, 
education and employment), Polity2, Victory Uncertain, Compulsory Voting and Multi-
Round Voting. Our data come from Afrobarometer surveys (round 3 and 4) and Latin 
America Barometer surveys.   
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Appendix B: Summary Data 
 
 
Table B1: Coding Details for All Variables 
 
 Name Mean SD Min Max Description Source(s) 
Access to Electricity 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 Equals one if the enumeration area has an 
electricity grid that most houses can access.  
Afrobarometer, Round 
3 and 4 (2005, 2008). 
Access to Food 1.12 1.23 0.00 4.00 Equals the frequency of times the respondent or 
his/her family has gone without food in the last 
year: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several 
times, 3=Many times, 4=Always. 
Afrobarometer, Round 
3 and 4 (2005, 2008). 
Age 36.44 14.13 18.00 130.00 Equals the age of the respondent. Afrobarometer, Round 
3 and 4 (2005, 2008). 
Boycott 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00 Equals one if some opposition leaders boycotted 
the election and zero otherwise (coded from 
Nelda14) 
Hyde, S. D., & 
Marinov, N. (2012). 
Which Elections Can 
Be Lost? Political 
Analysis, 20(2), 191–
210. 
Civil War 
 
0.16 0.78 0 6 An index of the intensity of civil conflict in a year Marshall 2007 
Compulsory Voting 
 
0.29 0.45 0 1 Equals one if an election had a compulsory voting 
rule.  
International IDEA 
Voter Turnout 
Website. 
http://www.idea.int/vt/ 
(Accessed July 2015).   
Demonstrations 1.49 3.76 0 43 The total number of any type of anti-government 
demonstrations, anti-government strikes and riots 
Banks (2005) 
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during the year 
Education 3.26 1.94 0.00 9.00 Equals the number of years of schooling the 
respondent has completed. 
Afrobarometer, Round 
3 and 4 (2005, 2008). 
 
AmericasBarometer, 
2004-2012. 
Election Protests 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 Equals one if there were election-related riots and 
protests after the election and zero otherwise. 
Coded from Nelda 29 which indicates whether 
there were “riots or protests after the election” that 
were “at least somewhat related to the outcome or 
handling of the election.” 
Hyde, S. D., & 
Marinov, N. (2012). 
Which Elections Can 
Be Lost? Political 
Analysis, 20(2), 191–
210. 
Employed 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 In the case of Afrobarometer this equals one if the 
respondent has a job that pays cash income (either 
full or part-time). It equals zero if the respondent 
does not have a job, or does not know if he/she 
has a job. 
 
In the case of AmericasBarometer this equals one 
if the respondent claims to be working or have a 
job. It equals zero if the respondent is not 
working, is a student, stays home, is looking for 
work, or is retired.  
 
Afrobarometer, Round 
3 and 4 (2005, 2008). 
 
AmericasBarometer, 
2004-2012. 
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Fraud 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 Equals one if there were concerns, before the 
election, that it would not be free and fair. Equals 
zero otherwise (coded from Nelda 11). 
Hyde, S. D., & 
Marinov, N. (2012). 
Which Elections Can 
Be Lost? Political 
Analysis, 20(2), 191–
210. 
GDP (log) 2.42 1.80 -1.66 6.64 The log of a county’s GDP (+1) World Bank 2013. 
Gender 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 Equals zero if the respondent is male and zero if 
the respondent is female.  
Afrobarometer, Round 
3 and 4 (2005, 2008). 
AmericasBarometer, 
2004-2012. 
Head of Household 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 Equals one if the respondent is the head of the 
household. Equals zero if the respondent is not the 
head of the household 
Afrobarometer, Round 
3 and 4 (2005, 2008). 
Incumbent Wins 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 Coded from Nelda 4: “Did the leader step down 
because the vote count gave victory to some other 
actor?” It equals one if no and zero otherwise 
Hyde, S. D., & 
Marinov, N. (2012). 
Which Elections Can 
Be Lost? Political 
Analysis, 20(2), 191–
210. 
Latin America Barometer 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 Equals one if the respondent is coded from the 
AmericasBarometer it equals zero if the 
respondent is coded from the Afrobarometer.  
Afrobarometer, Round 
3 and 4 (2005, 2008). 
AmericasBarometer, 
2004-2012. 
Leader Age 5.77 1.11 3.1 8.9 Equals the age of the leader in power (x 0.1) Goemans, Gleditsch, 
and Chiozza 2009 
Leader Tenure 24.18 23.38 0.24 134.11 Equals the number of days the incumbent has been 
in power (x 0.01) 
Goemans, Gleditsch, 
and Chiozza 2009 
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Opposition 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 Equals one if the respondent claims to be close to 
a party other than that of the incumbent party in 
the last election. Equals zero if the respondent 
claims to be close to the incumbent party. Missing 
if the respondent claims not to be close to any 
party, or does not state a party preference. 
Afrobarometer, Round 
3 and 4 (2005, 2008). 
Physical Integrity 4.59 2.05 0.00 8.00 An additive index of government sponsored 
repressive activity, including murder, torture, 
political imprisonment and forced disappearance. 
It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these 
four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these 
four rights). We use the average value from the 
three years prior to the election in order to ensure 
that this measure is not itself determined by 
election violence. 
Cingranelli and 
Richards 2010 
Polity2 3.92 4.27 -4.00 9.00 Measure of how autocratic or democratic a 
country is according to Polity. Negative values 
indicate more autocratic. Positive values equal 
more democratic. We use the average value from 
the three years prior to the election in order to 
ensure that this measure is not itself determined by 
election violence. 
Marshall and Jaggers 
(2002).  
Population (log) 15.97 1.45 12.86 20.80 A country’s population World Bank 2013 
Power Concessions 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 Equals one if the incumbent is removed from 
power by means other than the loss of the 
election—including through resignation, coup, or 
other non-electoral means—or the initial election 
results were annulled and new elections followed. 
Hyde, S. D., & 
Marinov, N. (2012). 
Which Elections Can 
Be Lost? Political 
Analysis, 20(2), 191–
210. 
 13 
 
This variable was coded from Nelda34: “Were 
results that were favorable to the incumbent 
canceled?”, Nelda 39: “Was the incumbent 
replaced?”, and Nelda 40: “If yes(Nelda39), did 
the leader step down because the vote count gave 
victory to some other political actor?” Power 
Concessions equals one if Nelda34 = “yes” or 
Nelda39 = “yes”. Cases in which Nelda40 = “ýes” 
are coded as zero to exclude cases in which the 
incumbent lost the election and stepped down.   
Pre-Election Violence 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 Equals one if there was civilian violence during 
the election, or if the government harassed the 
opposition. 
Hyde, S. D., & 
Marinov, N. (2012). 
Which Elections Can 
Be Lost? Political 
Analysis, 20(2), 191–
210. 
Pre-Election Protest 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 Equals one if there were any election-related anti-
government protests in the period before an 
election took place and zero otherwise.  
Hyde, S. D., & 
Marinov, N. (2012). 
Which Elections Can 
Be Lost? Political 
Analysis, 20(2), 191–
210. 
Victory Uncertain 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 Coded from Nelda12 and Nelda26. Nelda 12, 
which equals “yes” in cases in which the 
incumbent made “public statements expressing 
confidence” of victory, the opposition indicated 
that they were “not likely to win,” or there were 
cases in which the “incumbent or ruling party has 
been dominant for a number of years and is 
Hyde, S. D., & 
Marinov, N. (2012). 
Which Elections Can 
Be Lost? Political 
Analysis, 20(2), 191–
210. 
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projected to win in a landslide.” Nelda26 equals 
“yes” if there were “reliable polls that indicated 
popularity of ruling political party or of the 
candidates before elections” and “they were 
favorable for the incumbent”. Victory Uncertain 
equals 1 when Nelda12 either variable equals 
“no”, 0 when Nelda12 both equals 0, and is coded 
as missing when Nelda12 is both are “unclear” or 
“N/A.” 
Violence Against Protesters 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 Equals one if an incumbent used violence against 
demonstrators protesting the election and zero 
otherwise. Coded from Nelda31 “did the 
government use violence against demonstrators?” 
Hyde, S. D., & 
Marinov, N. (2012). 
Which Elections Can 
Be Lost? Political 
Analysis, 20(2), 191–
210. 
Vote 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00 Equals one if the respondent claims to have voted 
in the last election. Equals zero if the respondent 
claims to have not voted. Coded as missing the 
respondent didn’t know, couldn’t remember or 
refused to answer.  
Afrobarometer, Round 
3 and 4 (2005, 2008). 
AmericasBarometer, 
2004-2012. 
Voter Turnout 71.1 14.6 2.7 99.0 Equals voter turnout as a percentage of registered 
voters. 
International IDEA 
Voter Turnout 
Website. 
http://www.idea.int/vt/ 
(Accessed July 2015).   
Compulsory Voting 0.3 0.46 0 1 Equals one if there are compulsory voting rules 
during the election and zero otherwise.  
International IDEA 
Voter Turnout 
Website. 
http://www.idea.int/vt/ 
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(Accessed July 2015).   
Multi-Round Voting 0.20 0.40 0 1 Equals one if there were multiple rounds of voting 
in the current election and zero otherwise.  
Hyde, S. D., & 
Marinov, N. (2012). 
Which Elections Can 
Be Lost? Political 
Analysis, 20(2), 191–
210. 
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Appendix C: Robustness Checks 
 
Table C1: Fixed Effect and Random Effect Estimates for the Effect of Violence on Incumbent 
Wins, Protest and Power Concessions  
 
(1) 
Incumbent 
Wins 
(2) 
Incumbent 
Wins 
(3) 
Protest 
(4) 
Protest 
(5) 
Power 
Concessions 
(6) 
Power 
Concessions 
  
     
Pre-Election Violence 1.03** 0.73+ 2.03** 1.57+ -0.38 -0.29 
 
(0.33) (0.42) (0.50) (0.90) (1.12) (1.41) 
Protest     3.19* 3.18+ 
     (1.19) (1.71) 
Repress Protest      2.29 
      (2.71) 
Pre-Election Protest   1.22* 1.57+ -0.17 0.47 
   (0.53) (0.90) (1.14) (1.58) 
Physical Integrity 0.28** 0.06 -0.17 -0.43 0.02 0.21 
 (0.10) (0.16) (0.14) (0.30) (0.28) (0.48) 
Leader Age 0.05 0.12 -0.05 0.53 -0.27 0.18 
 (0.13) (0.19) (0.09) (0.48) (0.63) (0.17) 
Leader Tenure 0.004 -0.01 -0.02+ -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Civil War -0.14 -0.98* 0.25 1.29 0.20 0.09 
 (0.19) (0.44) (0.24) (0.94) (0.48) (0.64) 
GDP (log) -0.17 0.38 -0.36+ 4.99* 0.55 0.85 
 (0.15) (0.93) (0.21) (2.52) (0.54) (0.86) 
Population (log) 0.17 -4.82* 0.16 -11.04+ 0.12 0.26 
 (0.20) (2.28) (0.24) (5.70) (0.58) (0.80) 
Victory Uncertain -1.89** -1.98**     
 (0.30) (0.38)     
Polity2 -0.10** 0.00 0.02 -0.06 -0.05 -0.11 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.12) (0.10) (0.17) 
Demonstrations -0.003 0.03     
 (0.03) (0.04)     
 
      
Observations 458 307 206 87 206 206 
Log Likelihood -241.6 -94.75 -90.91 -21.96 -41.11 -40.34 
Random Effects Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No No 
Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.  Note that fixed effects cannot be estimated for 
the Power Concessions model due to a lack of observations.  
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Table C2: Alternative Coding for Pre-Election Violence 
 
(1) 
Incumbent 
Wins 
(2) 
Incumbent 
Wins 
(3) 
Incumbent 
Wins 
(4) 
Boycott 
(5) 
Boycott 
(6) 
Boycott 
(7) 
Turnout 
(8) 
Turnout 
(9) 
Turnout 
(10) 
Protest 
(11) 
Protest 
(12) 
Protest 
  
           
Pre-Election 
Violence 1.43** 1.82** 0.39 0.51 0.76* 0.35 2.27 9.77** -0.54 1.42** 0.92* 2.05** 
 
(0.41) (0.36) (0.30) (0.41) (0.36) (0.38) (3.74) (2.28) (3.10) (0.47) (0.46) (0.43) 
            
Observations 458 447 456 457 446 455 300 293 300 206 201 204 
Log Likelihood -250.3 -233.7 -255.1 -129.6 -124.9 -129.5 -1,203 -1,162 -1,203 -97.93 -96.91 -88.06 
NELDA15  & 
NELDA33  Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No 
NELDA 15  No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No 
NELDA 33  No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.  NELDA33 indicates if there was “significant violence involving civilian deaths 
immediately before, during, or after the election”. NELDA15 indicates whether there is “evidence that the government harassed the opposition”. 
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Table C3: Additional Control Variables, Incumbent Wins, Boycotts and Protest Models 
 
(1) 
Incumbent 
Wins 
(2) 
Incumbent 
Wins 
(3) 
Incumbent 
Wins 
(4) 
Boycott 
(5) 
Boycott 
(6) 
Boycott 
(10) 
Protest 
(11) 
Protest 
(12) 
Protest 
  
        
Pre-Election Violence 0.86** 1.08** 1.18* 0.62+ 0.70+ 1.41* 2.06** 2.46** 2.40** 
 (0.29) (0.33) (0.47) (0.35) (0.41) (0.54) (0.45) (0.60) (0.92) 
Election Monitors -0.43   -0.85+   0.52   
 (0.32)   (0.46)   (0.46)   
Radio Exposure (log per capita)  -0.24   -0.57   -0.61+  
  (0.28)   (0.37)   (0.36)  
Newspaper Circulation (log per capita)  0.38*   -0.31   -0.40  
  (0.18)   (0.21)   (0.28)  
Government Revenue (log per capita)   2.87*   4.56   -0.59 
   (1.47)   (2.85)   (3.00) 
Observations 445 312 179 444 310 178 205 130 72 
Log Likelihood -244.5 -166.9 -90.55 -124.4 -86.69 -43.77 -90.10 -53.84 -29.20 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.  Included but now shown are controls for Physical Integrity, Leader Age, Leader Tenure, 
Civil War, GDP (log), Population (log), Polity2, Victory Uncertain and Demonstrations. These results control for variables that might affect the costs of using electoral 
violence relative to other electoral strategies. Election Monitors equals one if international observers were present during the election and zero otherwise (Hyde and 
Marinov 2012). Radio Exposure equals the log of the number of radios per capita (.0001) (Banks 2005). Newspaper Circulation equals the log of daily newspaper 
circulation per capita (.0001) (Banks 2005). Government Revenue equals the log of government revenue per capita (Banks 2005). 
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Table C4: Protests and Power Concessions Including Elections where the Incumbent Lost 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Protest 
Power 
Concession 
Power 
Concession 
Power 
Concession 
Power 
Concession 
        
Protest  2.01** 1.92** -0.15 1.98** 
 
 (0.66) (0.63) (1.10) (0.61) 
Violence Against Protesters    0.18 0.16 -0.39 
 
  (0.88) (0.91) (1.22) 
Pre-Election Violence * 
Protest    18.16**  
    (1.73)  
Pre-Election Violence * 
Violence Against Protesters     0.74 
     (1.18) 
Pre-Election Violence 1.48** -0.11 -0.12 -16.64** -0.31 
 (0.35) (0.77) (0.77) (1.58) (0.75) 
Fraud 0.98* 1.10 1.10 1.62 1.13 
 (0.42) (0.94) (0.95) (1.09) (0.94) 
Physical Integrity 0.16+ -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.09) (0.27) (0.30) (0.27) (0.29) 
Leader Age 0.08 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.14 
 (0.19) (0.24) (0.26) (0.23) (0.25) 
Leader Tenure -0.02** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Civil War 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.11 
 (0.14) (0.22) (0.21) (0.23) (0.21) 
GDP (log) -0.26 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 
 (0.17) (0.29) (0.28) (0.31) (0.28) 
Population (log) 0.54** 0.24 0.24 0.31 0.25 
 (0.17) (0.30) (0.31) (0.33) (0.31) 
Polity2  -0.05 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.06 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
Incumbent Won Election 0.75* 1.91* 1.90* 1.94* 1.92* 
 (0.35) (0.85) (0.90) (0.85) (0.88) 
Pre-Election Protest 0.89* 0.56 0.57 0.76 0.58 
 (0.44) (0.66) (0.67) (0.77) (0.68) 
Constant -12.08** -11.02* -11.10* -11.90* -11.13* 
 (2.69) (5.10) (5.26) (5.47) (5.26) 
Observations 462 462 462 462 462 
Log Likelihood -161.7 -56.43 -56.13 -51.85 -56.26 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Includes cases where the incumbent lost the election.  
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Table C5: Additional Control Variables, Incumbent Wins, Boycotts and Protest Models 
 
(1) 
Incumbent Wins 
(2) 
Boycott 
(3) 
Protest 
  
  
Pre-Election Violence 0.69* 0.79* 2.02** 
 (0.31) (0.36) (0.47) 
Freedom of Speech -1.02** 0.17 0.13 
 (0.26) (0.29) (0.40) 
Leader Age 0.05 0.10 -0.00 
 (0.11) (0.19) (0.25) 
Leader Tenure 0.01 0.00 -0.02+ 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Civil War -0.17 0.43+ 0.11 
 (0.16) (0.24) (0.21) 
GDP (log) -0.06 -0.11 -0.33+ 
 (0.12) (0.16) (0.20) 
Population (log) -0.04 0.03 0.16 
 (0.18) (0.23) (0.20) 
Victory Uncertain -1.62** -1.73**  
 (0.26) (0.46)  
Polity2 -0.07* -0.10** 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
Demonstrations -0.00 -0.00  
 (0.03) (0.04)  
Pre-Election Protest   1.16+ 
   (0.63) 
Observations 454 453 204 
Log Likelihood -236.2 -125.6 -90.24 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.  Included but now shown are 
controls for Physical Integrity, Leader Age, Leader Tenure, Civil War, GDP (log), Population (log), Polity2, 
Victory Uncertain and Demonstrations. These results control for Freedom of Speech in order to account for 
possible reporting biases introduced by government censorship. Freedom of Speech equals zero in states with 
complete censorship. It equals one if there was some censorship. It equals two if there was no censorship in a 
given year (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). 
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